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Abstract
We analyze the democratic politics and competitive economics of a ‘golden rule’ that
separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to issue debt to
ﬁnance only capital items. Many national governments followed this rule in the 18th and
19th centuries and most U.S. states do today. We study an economy with a growing pop-
ulation of overlapping generations of long-lived but mortal agents. Each period, majorities
choose durable and nondurable public goods. In a special limiting case with demographics
that make Ricardian equivalence prevail, the golden rule does nothing to promote eﬃciency.
But when the demographics imply even moderate departures from Ricardian equivalence,
imposing the golden rule substantially improves the eﬃciency of democratically chosen al-
locations of public goods. We use some examples calibrated to U.S. demographic data and
ﬁnd greater beneﬁts from adopting the golden rule at the state level or with 19th century
demographics than under current national demographics.
∗We beneﬁted from comments from Manuel Amador, V.V. Chari, Mariacristina De Nardi, Robert Lucas, Leslie
McGranahan, Ellen McGrattan, Edward C. Prescott, Robert Shimer, Nancy Stokey, Judy Temple, Fran¸ cois Velde,
Ivan Werning, and especially three referees and an editor. Florin Bidian and Vadym Lepetyuk provided excellent
research assistance. Financial support from NSF and the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the
Federal Reserve System, or NSF.
†Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Research Department, 230 S. LaSalle St., Chicago, IL 60604, University of
Minnesota, and NBER. Email: bassetto@econ.umn.edu
‡New York University and Hoover Institution. Email: ts43@nyu.edu
1Key words: Golden rule, majority rule, Pareto eﬃcient allocation, public goods, government
debt, political economic equilibrium.
1 Introduction
A ‘golden rule’ prescribes that a government pay for nondurable goods and services out of
current revenues and that it issue debt to ﬁnance durable goods. This paper studies how some
alternative rules for ﬁnancing public expenditures aﬀect outcomes when durable and nondurable
public goods are chosen each period by direct elections within competitive economies inhabited
by overlapping generations of households who are not altruistic. When government ﬁnancing
restrictions do not distinguish among diﬀerent public goods according to their durability, adverse
incentives can confront voters. For example, because selﬁsh voters ignore the services that future
generations will receive, a comprehensive balanced budget rule makes voters prefer amounts of
durable public goods that are smaller than Pareto eﬃcient amounts. The golden rule oﬀsets
that adverse incentive by reducing the costs born by current voters and passing some costs on
to future taxpayers.
This paper provides a reason for ﬁnancing some government purchases by issuing debt that
is distinct from, and complementary to, reasons studied by Barro [6] and Lucas and Stokey [19],
who view government debt (either risk-free, as in Barro [6] and Aiyagari et. al. [2], or state-
contingent, as in Lucas and Stokey [19]) as a way to reallocate distorting taxes across time or
states of nature. To bring out the diﬀerence in our rationalizations of government debt from
the ones in those studies, the present paper assumes that the government can levy lump sum
taxes. This paper is about how, by aﬀecting voters incentives, rules for administering deﬁcits
aﬀect paths for government expenditures, something that the literature on tax smoothing takes
as exogenous.
We use a ‘guess and verify’ strategy by positing a two-parameter class of ﬁscal constitutions
that restrict government ﬁnancing. One parameter tells the fraction of durable government goods
the government can ﬁnance through borrowing, while the other measures the term to maturity
2of that debt. The golden rule, with 100% debt ﬁnancing of public investment, represents a
special case. We show that given any maturity of debt, a constitution of this form is ﬂexible
enough for there to exist values of debt ﬁnancing that cause electoral outcomes to implement a
Pareto eﬃcient allocation. The parameters that work depend on the parameters of the economy
and do not literally represent the golden rule. By asking how far from the golden rule are
the parameters that support a Pareto eﬃcient allocation, we are able to establish that for a
quantitatively interesting range of economies, the golden rule gives a good approximation to a
constitution that supports a Pareto eﬃcient allocation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the forces underlying
our basic ﬁndings by using a two-period model with three cohorts of agents. The model in this
section is rich enough to show how allowing government debt for ﬁnancing durable public goods
can align voters’ preferences with those of a Pareto planner. However, the simple setting of this
section omits subtle issues about the term structure of government debt, diﬀerences in incentives
across generations alive, and formalizing beliefs about future political and economic outcomes
that must be confronted in a model with a more realistic demographic structure and a longer
time horizon. We analyze those issues in the context of a richer overlapping generations model
with longer-lived agents in section 3. In this case, implementing an eﬃcient level of spending
through the political system does not necessarily require each household to ‘pay for what it gets;’
rather, eﬃcient spending can be attained by properly aligning marginal costs and beneﬁts of the
pivotal voters. In section 4, we use the section 3 model as the basis for calculations that evaluate
the quality of the golden rule as an approximation to a constitution that supports a Pareto
eﬃcient outcome. We ﬁnd that the golden rule is a good approximation. By contrast, rules that
fail to distinguish across durable and nondurable public goods generate signiﬁcant distortions
even with small departures from Ricardian equivalence. Interestingly, these distortions are much
more prominent and robust for U.S. states than for the federal government. Mobility across states
implies that households will discount future beneﬁts from public goods much more than what
would result from mortality and population growth alone; furthermore, the eﬀect of mobility
remains present even when generations are altruistically linked, as in Barro [5].1
1Bassetto with Sargent [7] tells about economists who have discussed the golden rule. Keynes long advocated
32 A two-period model
A simple two period model captures the main forces for intergenerational conﬂict that make
the constitutional rules for government deﬁcits important. The economy has three cohorts of
households: the initial old who live only in period 1; the initial young who live in both periods;
and the future young who live only in period 2. Each cohort is 1 + n times larger than the
previous one. Households consume a nondurable private good and also enjoy the services of a
public good, the durability of which matters in ways that we shall highlight.
Within each period of their lives, households have preferences ordered by
ca,t + u(Γt),
where ca,t is consumption of the private good in period t by a household of age a (young or old),
Γt is the amount of the public good per capita in period t,a n du is strictly increasing, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave. The initial young discount future utility at the
rate β. An individual in any cohort cares only about himself.2
Households are endowed with one unit of the private good in each period of their lives. The
government can turn one unit per capita of the private good into one unit of the public good.
The public good depreciates at a rate δΓ. To raise revenues, the government can collect lump
sum taxes τt on all households alive.




 (Γ1)=1− β(1 − δ
Γ)
(1)
For the second period, Pareto eﬃciency simply requires the marginal beneﬁt per capita of an
extra unit of the public good to equal its marginal cost per capita in terms of forgone private
consumption. For the ﬁrst period, Pareto eﬃciency adjusts the marginal social cost downward
to reﬂect the marginal present value of the public good left for period 2, namely, β(1 − δΓ).
the rule, even after writing the General Theory. In a personal communication to us, Robert Skidelsky told us
that he doubts that our model captures Keynes’s reasoning.
2Because the lack of Ricardian equivalence is very important for our results, we will return to this assumption
when discussing the quantitative implications of the full-ﬂedged model in section 5.
4We will contrast the Pareto-eﬃciency condition (1) with the policy choices that would be
preferred by diﬀerent cohorts.
2.1 Balanced budget and δΓ =1
First, consider the simplest scenario, in which the public good depreciates fully (δΓ =1 )a n d
a constitution requires the government to balance its budget in both periods. In this case, all
households alive would support providing the public good in its eﬃcient amount because all gain
the same utility from the good and contribute equally to its cost through lump sum taxes.
2.2 Balanced budget and δΓ < 1
Suppose next that the balanced-budget restriction is kept, but that δΓ < 1, so that some of the
ﬁrst-period investment carries beneﬁts into the second period. In this case, the initial old pay
for the period-1 investment but receive no second-period beneﬁts; the initial young pay for the
investment in the ﬁrst period and reap beneﬁts for 2 periods;3 and the cohort born in period 2
beneﬁts without contributing to the cost.
Now, the balanced-budget restriction leads to intergenerational conﬂict over the provision of
the public good. The initial old would prefer a level of the public good that satisﬁes u (Γ1)=1
because they do not beneﬁt from later services from the public good. Under a balanced budget,
they would want less of the public good than occurs in the allocation that satisﬁes (1). The policy
preferred by the young in period 1 depends on what they expect will occur in period 2. Suppose
they have perfect foresight. Both generations alive in period 2 will agree on providing the public
good in an amount that solves u (Γ2) = 1, which implies that any additional undepreciated
public goods inherited from the previous period will be accompanied by decreased expenses for
the public good in the second period. Therefore, the initial young face the following costs and
beneﬁts from an extra unit per capita of the public good in period 1:
• Additional tax in period 1 to provide public good equals 1.
3However, even for them, the costs and beneﬁts need not be fully aligned.
5• Additional beneﬁt in period 1 equals u (Γ1).
• Lower tax in period 2 resulting from the lower need to buy new units of the public good
equals (1 − δΓ)/(1 + n).4
The period-1 policy preferred by the initial young equates the present value of their marginal






In selecting their preferred policy, the initial young neglect costs and beneﬁts accruing both to
the initial old and to the cohort that has not yet been born. When there is no population growth,
these neglected eﬀects cancel, inducing the young to support the eﬃcient provision of the public
good. But if there is population growth or decline, their preferences will be for underproviding
or overproviding it.
The unborn generation in period 1 would support the highest possible investment in the public
good because they pay nothing and get beneﬁts in the second period. But their preferences would
not aﬀect government policy in period 1 because decisions will depend only on the preferences of
living cohorts. Only under special circumstances would the outcome be Pareto eﬃcient. In the
case of positive population growth, both cohorts living in period 1 would support underprovision
of the public good, so this is the most likely outcome.
2.3 Government debt allowed and δΓ < 1
Continue to assume that δΓ < 1, but now suppose that the government can ﬁnance a fraction x
of its period-1 spending through debt issues that must be repaid in period 2. Because household
preferences are linear in private consumption, the interest rate in a competitive equilibrium will
be 1/β.
4The assumed preferences make the public good subject to a congestion externality, that contributes the term
1+n. A similar analysis would apply if congestion were not present.




Debt shifts some of the cost of the initial investment onto future generations. Since this lowers
the cost borne by the initial old, they will support greater provision of the public good. If
x = β(1 − δΓ), their preferred policy coincides with the socially eﬃcient level.
For the young, the presence of debt lowers the marginal cost of period-1 spending by x in
the ﬁrst period, but raises it by x
β(1+n) in the second period when the debt becomes due. So the












As for the old, when x = β(1 − δΓ), the policy preferred by the young is Pareto eﬃcient.
2.4 Discussion
The simple example above illustrates the beneﬁts of a budgetary rule that imposes budget balance
on government spending for nondurable goods, but allows issuing debt to pay for durable public
investment. This rule more closely aligns the costs and beneﬁts accruing to diﬀerent generations;5
When x = β(1−δΓ), the rule emulates a competitive rental market for public goods. If such
a market existed, eﬃciency could be attained by imposing period-by-period budget balance and
requiring the government to rent the ﬂow of services of the durable good. That would make the
distinction between durable and nondurable public goods disappear: all households alive would
equally value the ﬂow of services and would equally pay for it. There seem to be cases in which
a rental market could operate. For example, our analysis provides a rationale for requiring the
government to lease its vehicles or other standard durable equipment. But many major public
investments are subject to monopoly and/or monopsony, and for these a rental market would not
5The beneﬁts of the golden rule in aligning costs and beneﬁts have been previously discussed; examples from
very diﬀerent sources are in Studensky [37], page 15, Secrist [35], and the Economist [1]. However, these beneﬁts
were mostly cast in terms of fairness, rather than eﬃciency.
7work. Any major infrastructure project, such as a canal, would necessarily not face competition
from a good substitute, generating monopoly power on the supply side. On the demand side, no
other entity would be allowed to bid against the government for renting nuclear missiles.
This simple two-period model contains the main intuition behind many of our results, but
there are good reasons to develop a model with longer lived agents and a longer-lived economy.
1. Debt maturity. In a multi-period environment, the maturity of debt plays an important
role. Except for speciﬁc maturities, there will not be in general a fraction of debt ﬁnancing
x that will ensure unanimous support for an eﬃcient outcome. However, we will be able
to satisfy the weaker requirement that the pivotal voter supports eﬃcient provision of the
public good.
2. Quantitative importance of Ricardian non-equivalence. The simple model is enough to
suggest that the old will favor underprovision of durable public goods under a balanced
budget, but we need a multiperiod environment to evaluate the quantitative importance
of this motive and other deviations from Ricardian equivalence.
3. Adding important qualiﬁcations. Some qualitative implications diﬀer in a model with longer
and more empirically plausible horizons. In the example above, there is a tight connection
between population growth and the preferences of the initial young for over/underprovision
under a balanced budget; this connection is looser in multiperiod environments. As we shall
see, reasonable calibrations imply that all generations alive favor underinvestment under a
balanced budget, even when population is constant.
3 The Benchmark Economy
Households can live at most N + 1 periods, where we allow N =+ ∞. Conditional on having
survived until then, each household faces a probability 1 − θs of death in its s-th period of life.
Population grows at a constant rate n and the demographic structure starts from a steady state
and remains in it. Households consume a private good and enjoy the services of two public goods,










[cs−t,s + v(Gs,Γs)] (3)
where cs−t,s is consumption of the private good in period s by a household of age s − t (born in
period t), Γs is the per capita stock of the durable public good; Gs is the amount of nondurable
public good per capita in period s. For brevity, we will often call Γs public capital and Gs public
consumption. We assume that v is strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and that
it satisﬁes Inada conditions. We also assume β(1 + n) < 1. There is no uncertainty.7
From section 2, we retain the simplifying assumptions that preferences are linear in private
consumption and that all living households value public goods equally. We will discuss how the
r e s u l t sd e p e n do nb o t ha s s u m p t i o n si ns e c t i o n5a n di nt h ea p p e n d i x .
Each household alive is endowed with 1 unit of labor that it supplies to a ﬁrm that can turn
K units of private capital and L units of labor into F(K,L) units of an intermediate good.8
Firms can turn a unit of the intermediate good into one unit of either the private consumption
good, private capital, nondurable public good, or public capital. Private capital depreciates at a
rate δk, and public capital depreciates at a rate δΓ. The economy-wide resource constraints are
















where it is investment in private capital per capita, γt is investment in public capital per capita,
Kt is the capital stock per capita at the end of period t (to be used for production in period





7Our working paper version (Bassetto with Sargent [7]) includes uncertainty, with minimal impact on the
results stated in this paper.
8We assume F to be increasing, concave, continuously diﬀerentiable, linearly homogeneous and to satisfy Inada
conditions.











t=0(1 + n)−t 	t−1
j=0 θj
is the fraction of households of age s. The initial values of K−1 and Γ−1 are exogenous.
3.1 Pareto-optimal allocations
Either we assume that private consumption can be negative or, more realistically, we will restrict
our analysis to a range of parameters and utility entitlements that make private consumption be
positive.
We deﬁne a sequence {{cs,t}N
s=0,i t,γ t,G t,K t,Γt}∞
t=0 to be a feasible (real) allocation if it
satisﬁes equations (4), (5), and (6) and is bounded.9 We deﬁne a feasible allocation to be
eﬃcient or ex ante Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible allocation that delivers a weakly
higher expected utility to each generation and a strictly higher utility to at least one generation.
We assume that the planner can implement direct intergenerational transfers. When these are
not possible, the golden rule has important distributional implications that we will discuss later.
The linearity of utility in consumption makes eﬃcient allocations easy to characterize. In each
period t, taking 1 unit of consumption per capita from each surviving household born in period
t − j allows a planner to award a consumption increase of λj/λs to each surviving household
born in period t − s. This costs the former generation βj 	j−1
m=0 θm in expected utility and gives




(1+n)j−s .10 The slope of the Pareto frontier is therefore
9The term “real” is introduced to distinguish this allocation from the asset allocation that we will introduce
later. Wherever not speciﬁed, by allocation we mean real allocation. The assumption of boundedness could be
relaxed, but bounded sequences are a particularly simple commodity space to work with. All inﬁnite sums that
appear below are well deﬁned in this commodity space. Technological growth could be accommodated by suitably
rescaling variables and introducing a shifter in preferences to ensure stationarity.
10If t−j<0, we measure utility from time 0, so the expected utility cost is βt 	j−1
m=j−t θm. Likewise, if t−s<0,








10uniquely determined as the ratio [β(1 + n)]j−s. Movements along the frontier are achieved
by redistributing consumption without aﬀecting other variables. The diﬀerence between this
situation and what prevails in a standard Pareto problem for consumers having strictly concave
utility is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. In the standard problem, the slope of the utility frontier depends
on the allocation, and the frontier is recovered by varying the Pareto weights assigned to each
group in the Pareto problem; with our quasilinear preferences, a ﬁxed Pareto weight corresponds
to all utility pairs, so that the frontier cannot be traced out by varying the Pareto weight.


























Pareto frontier with strictly concave utility
Slope = Pareto weight→


























Pareto frontier with quasilinear utility
←  Pareto weight is unique
Figure 1: Pareto problem and the shape of the frontier
We consider only those allocations in which all households belonging to the same cohort are








t {Ct + v(Gt,Γt)} (8)
subject to (4), (5) and (6).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
vG(Gt,Γt)=1 ,t =0 ,... (9)
vΓ(Gt,Γt)=1− β(1 − δ










− (1 − δ
k) t =0 ,... (11)
The assumptions about F guarantee that (11) has a unique solution Kt. Equations (9) and (10)
imply that Gt and Γt are uniquely determined as well. All of these variables are independent of
the initial levels of public and private capital, Γ−1 and K−1. Investment can then be deduced
from (5) and (6), and consumption per capita, but not its allocation across diﬀerent cohorts, can
be found from (4).
3.2 Implementing Pareto-eﬃciency through elections
A Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be attained under the following institutions. A government is
empowered to levy taxes and purchase public goods. A constitution speciﬁes that public goods
be chosen by majority vote each period. The constitution names two parameters (α,x)t h a t
restrict debt repayment and government borrowing: a fraction α of government-issued consols is
to be redeemed each period and a fraction x of public investment is paid for with debt. Decisions
unfold as follows:
(i) In period t, the government purchases Gt and γt from competitive ﬁrms. The amounts are
chosen by majority voting, subject to ﬁnancing restrictions to be described in points (iii),
(iv), and (v).
(ii) Taxes are lump sum and levied equally on all living households.
(iii) Each unit of nondurable spending Gt must be ﬁnanced from taxes collected in period t.
(iv) For each unit of public investment γt,af r a c t i o nx is paid for by issuing new consols.11
(v) In each period, the government raises enough taxes to pay interest on outstanding consols
and to repurchase a fraction α>0o ft h e m .
11Diﬀerent debt maturities and repayment schedules could be considered, provided that the amount of bonds is
adjusted appropriately. In what follows, we will assume that the government issues exactly x. When median(θs) <
1+n, as we will generally assume, the conditions that ensure that it is desirable to set x to a positive number
also ensure that all the people alive will beneﬁt from issuing debt, so that issuing the full amount x would be
chosen even if the constitution prescribed a limit only on debt issuance, rather than a level.
12(vi) Households and ﬁrms trade goods and factors of production in competitive markets.
Features (i), (iii), and (iv) capture the golden rule. The “constitution” does not specify
amounts of public goods but restricts how to pay for them. By virtue of the ways that they align
costs and beneﬁts from public goods, the ﬁnancing restrictions provide incentives for voters to
choose eﬃcient amounts.
An attractive feature of this institutional setup is its simplicity. Future generations require
very little information about past behavior, making it easier to enforce such a rule, for example,
by threatening to repudiate government debt. More complicated mechanisms might require
future generations to know more to detect whether their predecessors had conformed to the rule.
Therefore, it could take longer for a more complicated rule to become understood and accepted.
3.3 Equilibrium
We ﬁrst describe the households’ optimization problem, then deﬁne an equilibrium. House-
holds can trade physical capital and government consols. A tax-debt policy is a bounded se-
quence {τt,B t}∞
t=0,w h e r eτt are lump-sum taxes per capita in period t and Bt is the amount
of government-issued consols per capita at the end of period t.W es e tt h ec o u p o np a y m e n to n
each consol to 1. A price system is a sequence {wt,r t,p t}∞
t=0,w h e r ewt is the wage rate in period
t, rt is the rental rate of capital, and pt is the price of a consol, exclusive of the time-t coupon
payment. An asset allocation is a sequence {{ks,t,b s,t}
N−1
s=0 }∞
t=0 consisting of the capital and the
government consols held by a household of the cohort born in t − s at the end of period t.
A household born in period s ≥ 0 takes as given the price system and the tax policy and












subject to the ﬂow budget constraint






bt−s−1,t−1 t = s,...,s+ N.
(13)
13This budget constraint assumes that households participate in a collective insurance agreement
that redistributes the assets of people who die to the survivors in proportion to their holdings.
This insurance scheme does not inﬂuence the resulting preferences over the public good. However,
it is necessary to ensure that an interior solution exists at the equilibrium interest rate.12 We
assume that k−1,s−1 = b−1,s−1 = 0, so households start with no wealth.13
To prevent Ponzi schemes, it is necessary to impose a borrowing limit on households. If N is
ﬁnite, we require kN,s+N = bN,s+N =0 .I fN is inﬁnite, we require a household’s asset allocation
to be essentially bounded from below.14 We also require households to choose bounded real
allocations.
Households that were born before period 0 solve a problem similar to problem (12)-(13) from
period 0 onwards, except for their initial condition. A household born in period j<0 starts
from an (exogenous) initial condition (k−j−1,−1,b −j−1,−1)t h a ti sn o tn e c e s s a r i l y0 . 15
A competitive equilibrium is a real allocation {{ˆ cs,t}N
s=0,ˆ it, ˆ γt, ˆ Gt, ˆ Kt, ˆ Γt}∞
t=0, an asset alloca-
tion {{ˆ ks,t,ˆ bs,t}
N−1
s=0 }∞
t=0, a tax-debt policy {ˆ τt, ˆ Bt}∞




s=−N,K −1,Γ−1,B −1}, such that:





t=max(0,s)) solves the maximization problem of the represen-
t a t i v eh o u s e h o l db o r ni np e r i o ds;
12With quasilinear preferences, households would bunch all of their consumption at speciﬁc ages if their discount
factor changed from period to period due to changes in the survival probability.
13This implies that the corresponding terms in (13) can be neglected, and the undeﬁned term θ−1 does thus
not appear.
14The household’s asset allocation is bounded from below if {kt−s,t,b t−s,t}∞
t=s form a sequence that is bounded
from below; it is essentially bounded from below if there exists an alternative asset allocation {˜ kt−s,t,˜ bt−s,t}∞
t=s
that is bounded below, satisﬁes (13) for a suitable bounded choice of {ct−s,t}∞
t=s, and is such that [rt +1−




s=0 λsks,−1 = K−1 and

N−1
s=0 λsbs,−1 = B−1.
14(ii) at any time t, factor prices equal marginal products:










(iii) at any time t, the allocation satisﬁes the feasibility conditions (4), (5) and (6);










(v) the government budget constraint holds:
ˆ pt ˆ Bt =
ˆ Bt−1
1+n
(1 + ˆ pt)+ ˆ Gt +ˆ γt − ˆ τt. (16)





,t ≥ 0 (17)
1/β =ˆ rt+1 +1− δ
k,t ≥ 0 (18)





[ˆ rt +1− δ
k]ˆ kt−s,t−1 +(ˆ pt +1 ) ˆ bt−s,t−1

=0 ,s ≥ 0, (19)
Because utility is linear in consumption, in any competitive equilibrium, individual consump-
tion completely absorbs the impact of shocks at time t, making history irrelevant, just as it is in a
Pareto-optimal allocation. Furthermore, substituting (14) into (18), shows that capital coincides
16These conditions include the assumption that there are no pricing bubbles. When N = ∞, introducing one-
period debt would be suﬃcient to rule bubbles out. When N is ﬁnite, it is necessary to assume that households
can set up an inﬁnitely-lived intermediary. Huang and Werner [18] provide a complete treatment of this issue.
15with its Pareto-eﬃcient value. Working backwards through (14), we uniquely determine the
equilibrium factor prices; like the labor supply and capital, they are independent of {Gt,Γt}∞
t=0.
Next we deﬁne a political-economic equilibrium in which households collectively choose pub-
lic spending and investment each period. To evaluate those choices, households must form
expectations about the evolution of the economy. A history of the economy is a sequence
ht ≡{ Gj,Γj}t
j=0, for any t ≥ 0.17 We deﬁne a political-economic equilibrium in terms of a
mapping Ψ that associates to each history ht at i m e - t allocation (other than public spending
and capital, which are already included in ht)( {cs(ht)}N
s=0,i(ht),γ(ht),K(ht)), a time-t tax-
debt policy (B(ht),τ(ht)), a time-t price vector (w(ht),r(ht),p(ht)), a time-t asset allocation
({ks(ht),b s(ht)}
N−1
s=0 ), and a time-t+1 choice of government spending and capital (G(ht),Γ(ht)).
To obtain the time-0 values of government spending and capital, we associate two values G(∅)
and Γ(∅) with the null history. Given any history hj, each mapping Ψ recursively generates
a history from hj: ht =( ht−1,G(ht−1),Γ(ht−1)). Each mapping Ψ and its associated history




A mapping ˜ Ψ ≡ ({˜ cs}N
s=0,{˜ ks,˜ bs}
N−1
s=0 ,˜ i, ˜ γ, ˜ K, ˜ B,˜ τ, ˜ w,˜ r, ˜ p)i sapolitical-economic equilibrium
when it has the following properties.
(i) (Competitive equilibrium) Given any history hj, including the null history, the real and
asset allocations, the price system, and tax/debt policy induced by ˜ Ψ form a competitive
equilibrium from the initial conditions Γj−1, ˜ K(hj−1), ˜ B(hj−1),{˜ ks(hj−1),˜ bs(hj−1)}
N−1
s=0 .
(ii) (Self-interested voting) Given any history hj−1, including the null, ( ˜ G(hj−1), ˜ Γ(hj−1)i sa
Condorcet winner over any alternative proposal (G,Γ), assuming that in the future the
economy will follow the path implied by ˜ Ψ. That is, given any alternative (G,Γ), the
17Although other variables could be introduced as part of the history, it can be shown that their presence would
be redundant with the deﬁnition of an equilibrium below. See e.g. Chari and Kehoe [12].
18hj−1 is the predecessor of the history hj. When we consider an initial history h0, ˜ ks(h−1)i sks,−1, the initial
level that is exogenously given; the same applies to other variables.






















































































Here ˜ hj+t is the history induced by ˜ Ψf r o mhj−1; ˜ h
j+t
G,Γ is the history induced by choosing
(G,Γ) in period j and following ˜ Ψ afterwards.
(iii) (Budget balance) Given any non-null history,
˜ τ(h
t)=
(1 + α˜ p(ht)) ˜ B(ht−1)
1+n
+ Gt +( 1− x)˜ γ(h
t) (21)
where Gt is the appropriate element of the history ht.
Requirement (i) states that no matter what happened in the past, ˜ Ψ prescribes a path that is
a competitive equilibrium. Requirement (ii) states that at each time t, the majority prefers not to
deviate from an equilibrium ( ˜ G, ˜ Γ), taking into account how a deviation eﬀects contemporaneous
utility and also how it aﬀects the future by altering subsequent histories. Requirement (iii)
embodies the budget rule restrictions that prevent borrowing to pay for Gt, limit the ability to
borrow to pay for γt, and impose a repayment schedule on existing debt.
We focus on Markov equilibria.19
19Markov equilibria exclude “trigger-strategy” equilibria in which failure to deliver a certain amount of public
goods in the current period leads households to unfavorable expectations in the future even though the “funda-
mentals” of the economy are unaﬀected.
17Proposition 1 There exist Markov equilibria in which G and Γ are independent of past variables.
Following any history, all variables are the same in all these Markov equilibria, except for the
distribution of consumption. Though individual consumption may vary across diﬀerent equilibria,
all generations achieve the same welfare ex ante in all these Markov equilibria.
Proof. We prove existence by constructing an equilibrium. We focus here on the crucial step
of determining government spending and relegate the determination of all other variables to the
appendix. To get the values of G(ht−1)a n dΓ ( ht−1), we propose a candidate equilibrium in which
future levels of public consumption and capital are unaﬀected by the current ones. Within the
equilibrium, an increase in the time-t provision of either public good beneﬁts only the households
that are alive in period t. On the cost side, equations (16) and (21) imply that an additional unit
of Gt increases time-t taxes by 1 unit, with no eﬀect on subsequent taxes. An additional unit of
γt increases time-t taxes by 1−x units and leads to a reduction in γt+1 of (1−δΓ)/(1+n) units,









(1 − x)(1 − δΓ)
1+n









Γ − α](1 − α)
j−2.
To a person of age s, the expected present value of taxes per unit of public investment is therefore





































The indirect utility function over government expenditure policy for this person is
v(G,Γ) − G − QsΓ. (23)
If we order households by Qs, the preferences associated with (23) satisfy the order restriction
of Rothstein [32, 33]. This implies that a Condorcet winner exists, and that it corresponds to
18the policy preferred by the person with median Qs. The candidate equilibrium therefore sets
G(ht−1)a n dΓ ( ht−1)t o
argmax
G,Γ
v(G,Γ) − G − median(Qs)Γ. (24)
Given our assumptions, a unique solution to problem (24) exists. This proves that, when house-
holds believe that future values of G and Γ will be unaﬀected by the history of play, the same
will hold of the current values over which they vote. QED.
To save breath, we will refer to “the” Markov equilibrium and ignore the multiplicity that is
irrelevant for the aggregate allocation and for welfare. We proceed to compare an equilibrium
allocation with a Pareto-optimal one.
3.4 Analytical Results
Within the Markov equilibrium, public consumption is at its eﬃcient level because the solution
of (24) satisﬁes the Pareto-eﬃciency requirement (9). With quasilinear and identical preferences,
the level of public consumption G will be eﬃcient if households are forced to pay for it through
contemporaneous taxes. The intuition underlying this result is that a balanced-budget restriction
for nondurable public consumption converts the decision about its level into a static one. All
living households agree about its beneﬁts and share the costs. That leads to an eﬃcient decision.
When a balanced-budget restriction is in eﬀect, the marginal cost perceived by a house-
hold of age s for the durable public good is Qs =1−
θsβ(1−δΓ)
1+n . Under the assumption that
median(θs) < 1+n, i.e., that population does not shrink too fast, the ﬁrst-order condition of
(24) implies a higher marginal value of public capital than does the eﬃciency condition (10). In
expressing political preferences over public goods, households consider only their private costs
and beneﬁts; they neglect both costs and beneﬁts of households of other ages, and the beneﬁts
of unborn cohorts who would gain from current investment but not be called to pay for it. When
median(θs) < 1+n, the ignored beneﬁts of future generations dominate and underinvestment
ensues, independently of the identity of the median voter.
It is natural to expect that allowing some debt ﬁnancing of public investment would inspire
the generations currently alive to support increased investment, since some of the cost could then
19be shifted to future generations. This is indeed the case for all the calibrated examples that we
analyze below. For generic survival processes, however, debt ﬁnancing not only shifts costs to
the unborn cohorts; it also reshuﬄes costs within the generations who are alive when decisions
are made. Since decisions are made by majority rule, allowing debt ﬁnancing will be beneﬁcial
only if the cost perceived by the pivotal voter decreases. When population grows, a suﬃcient
condition for increased debt ﬁnancing – a higher x – to promote an increase in public investment
is that α ≤ δΓ: the repayment rate of debt should be lower than the depreciation rate of capital.20
Low values of α imply that debt is repurchased slowly, indicating a long maturity of debt and
shifting costs toward unborn generations. The condition above ensures that the costs passed on
to future generations are big enough to reduce the marginal cost of public investment perceived
by all living generations. Allowing some long-term debt is thus unequivocally beneﬁcial, whereas
short-term debt might reduce eﬃciency.
This analysis leaves open how much debt the government should be allowed to issue to
improve eﬃciency or to achieve Pareto optimality. In the appendix, we prove that, given a
maturity structure α of the debt, there exists a fraction of debt ﬁnancing x∗ that induces voters
to implement the Pareto-eﬃcient public investment. But in general little can be said about how
x∗ varies with the parameters of the model. To get tighter results, we move on now to consider
two special cases in which there is unanimous consensus among all generations alive over public
investment.
3.4.1 Mimicking Rental Markets.
When the repayment rate of debt and depreciation of public capital match (α = δΓ), all house-
holds support the eﬃcient level of public investment when the fraction of debt ﬁnancing is set
at
x
∗ = β(1 − δ
Γ). (25)
In the two-period model of section 2, we noted that setting x = β(1 − δΓ)s e r v e dt og i v e
outcomes that mimic setting up a market in which the government rents the ﬂows of services
20This can be proved through tedious algebra.
20from public capital subject to a balanced budget restriction. This value of debt eﬀectively ensured
that the current generations would “sell” the undepreciated capital left after one period at its
correct social value. The same intuition applies to our more general environment. However, since
both government debt and public capital now last longer than two periods, mimicking a rental
market requires matching costs and beneﬁts in all periods that follow the initial investment. This
can be achieved by matching the maturity of debt to the durability of public capital. Several
authors have anticipated this result by advocating the principle that “people be made to pay
what they enjoy.”21
When α  = ¯ δΓ,t h ex that leads to eﬃciency does not make people pay for what they enjoy. To
get eﬃciency, it is not important to match (marginal) costs and beneﬁts of current investment
for each cohort, born and unborn. What matters is matching marginal costs and beneﬁts for the
pivotal voters among the cohorts that actually participate in the investment decision.
While our main analysis shows that matching debt maturity to project durability is not
necessary to achieve eﬃciency, the goal of unanimous agreement would oﬀer a justiﬁcation for
trying to implement that match. Furthermore, determining the correct level of debt is much
easier in this case, since it would be independent of the demographic structure of the economy.
Comparative statics when the government tries to mimic rental markets is also simple and
intuitive: the less durable is public capital, the less debt should be issued, and the shorter its
maturity should be. Also, the more households discount the future (including the beneﬁts of
future public capital), the less debt should be issued.
On the quantitative side, when α ≈ δΓ, we ﬁnd that 100% debt ﬁnancing, as implied by
the golden rule, closely approximates what is needed to support eﬃciency. While equation (25)
suggests x∗ < 100%, if decisions are made every year, then it it is plausible to set β close to 1
and to set δΓ to be small. This provides intuition for the numerical results obtained below in
which 100% debt ﬁnancing performs very well.
A drawback to putting α = δΓ is that it requires setting diﬀerent maturities and diﬀerent levels
of debt ﬁnancing for diﬀerent types of public investment. Introducing a constitutional restriction
21See e.g. Secrist [35].
21on debt ﬁnancing that distinguishes multiple categories of investments may be cumbersome and
could exacerbate politicians’ temptation to misclassify public spending, a temptation that is
already introduced by the broad distinction between current and capital public spending that
is embedded in the golden rule.22 In the calibrated examples, we will explore the quantitative
consequences of setting the same maturity structure and the same level of debt ﬁnancing (100%)
for all types of investment.
3.4.2 Age-Independent Probability of Survival
We now consider the case in which N = ∞ and θs = ¯ θ, s =0 ,..., which puts us into setting
of the overlapping generation model of Blanchard [8], in which all households face a constant
probability of death, independent of age. This case is interesting not only as a benchmark, but
also because it leads to results that resemble those of the quantitative calibration of the next
subsection. There, the calibrated probabilities of dying (or moving) from one year to the next
are almost constant over much of the age spectrum, making the Blanchard model give a good
approximation to the incentives faced by the pivotal voters.
Having ruled out wealth eﬀects through the assumption of quasilinear preferences, age diﬀer-
ences are the only potential sources of conﬂict among diﬀerent living cohorts. When households
face the same survival process, independently of age, they share the same preferences for public
goods; hence, elections will be unanimous, independently of the value of x.
In this case, simple algebra shows that more debt ﬁnancing always provides incentives for more
public investment, independently of the maturity of debt. This is because extra debt creates no
redistribution of costs among generations alive, but it rather only shifts costs to future cohorts.
The eﬃcient level of investment is attained if
x
∗ =
β(1 − δΓ)(1− βθ(1 − α)/(1 + n))
1 − βθ(1 − δΓ)/(1 + n)
> 0. (26)
Alternatively, for a ﬁxed value of x, (26) can be inverted to compute the maturity structure of
22Poterba [25] and Bohn and Inman [9] show that, if present, misclassiﬁcation of expenses has not undone the
bite of the golden rule in the case of U.S. states. More in general, evidence that constitutional clauses aﬀect state
government behavior is also presented in Poterba [24, 26] and Poterba and Rueben [27].















1 − β(1 − δΓ) θ
1+n
β2(1 − δΓ) θ
1+n
(x − β(1 − δ
Γ)) (27)
Equations (26) and (27) imply a negative relationship between the maturity of debt and the
amount of debt ﬁnancing that achieves eﬃciency. Intuitively, more debt ﬁnancing and a longer
maturity are alternative ways of shifting costs away from the current generations; hence, they
substitute for one another as ways of supporting an eﬃcient level of investment. While a positive
solution to (26) can be found for any maturity, some values of x are inconsistent with α ∈ [0,1].
If too much debt ﬁnancing is allowed, even one-period debt (α = 1) will generate an incentive
for the current generations to overinvest. If instead x is too low, even consols that are never
repurchased (α = 0) are not suﬃcient to shift enough costs to future generations to restore
eﬃciency.23
A higher depreciation rate for public capital implies that the eﬃcient debt ﬁnancing is smaller
or that the eﬃcient maturity is shorter, as one would expect. The eﬀect of increasing the
probability of survival θ and/or decreasing the population growth rate n is ambiguous.24 The
optimal level of x does not converge to 0 as θ/(1 + n) converges to 1; however, the ineﬃciency
caused by a given x vanishes in the limit as θ/(1 + n) → 1, because then Ricardian equivalence
holds and implies that any debt structure would deliver a Pareto-optimal outcome.
Finally, (27) implies that, in order for the golden rule to achieve exact eﬃciency, the maturity
structure of debt should be shorter than the durability of capital: α>δ Γ.
4 Calibrated Examples
The previous theoretical results suggest that ﬁnancing some but not necessarily 100% of public
investment with debt brings election outcomes close to Pareto eﬃciency. If we interpret the
23Debt stability requires α ∈ (−n,2+n), which is weaker than α ∈ [0,1]. However, values outside of [0,1] are
harder to reinterpret in terms of a maturity structure of debt.
24The optimal amount of debt is decreasing in θ/(1+n) if and only if δΓ >α ,a n dα∗ is decreasing in θ/(1+n)
if and only if x>β (1 − δ).
23golden rule as prescribing that 100% of the cost of public investment be ﬁnanced by debt issue,
it is interesting to inquiry of our model: how close is the eﬃcient debt allowance x∗ to 100%?
And what is the eﬃciency loss from not setting x exactly to x∗?
To answer these questions, we now consider three calibrated examples. Throughout the three
examples, we assume:
• Decisions are taken every year, so 1 year is the appropriate period length;
• β =0 .96;
• In the baseline experiment, we take α =0 .04522, corresponding to a half-life of debt of 15
years. We also report the value of α that would make the golden rule (100% debt ﬁnancing)
exactly optimal.
• For depreciation, we consider a low value of ¯ δΓ =0 .03 and a high value of ¯ δΓ =0 .06. The
former is meant to capture depreciation for major infrastructure projects, the latter is a
number commonly used for private capital.
The three examples diﬀer in their demographic structures:25
1. For “U.S. now,” we calibrate the survival process and the age distribution to that faced by
the U.S. population in 2000.
2. For “U.S. 1880”, we calibrate the survival process and the age distribution to that faced by
the U.S. population in 1880. We will use this example to see to what extent demographic
changes over the last two centuries aﬀect the outcomes under the golden rule.
3. To consider how federal and state governments are aﬀected diﬀerently by the budget rule,
we calibrate the age structure to that of Illinois in 2000.26 We will label this experiment as
“Illinois now.” The crucial diﬀerence between “U.S. now” and “Illinois now” is the degree
25The details of the demographic structure are contained in appendix B.
26The results presented here diﬀer slightly from those in our working paper version (Bassetto with Sargent [7]).
This discrepancy is due to correcting a mistake in computing the mobility by age.
24of mobility. The model probability of “death” is calibrated by summing the probability of
dying and that of moving out of the state.27
U.S. Now U.S. 1880s Illinois Now
¯ δΓ =0 .03 114% 108% 108%
¯ δΓ =0 .06 77% 80% 80%
Table 1: Optimal Amount of Debt Financing x∗
Table 1 reports the optimal fraction of public investment that should be ﬁnanced by debt.28
The main conclusion that we draw from this table is that this fraction is not very sensitive to
the demographic structure and evolution of the population: it is about the same in a calibration
with low population growth and low mortality rate (U.S. now), high population growth and high
mortality rate (U.S. in 1880) and low population growth with high mobility rate (Illinois now).
By contrast, the table shows that the debt is sensitive to the depreciation rate.
A similar picture emerges if we set x = 1 and try to recover the value of α that would make
it optimal. When δ =0 .03, the implied value of α is about 0.035 for the United States now to
0.037 for Illinois; with δ =0 .06, the range is from about 0.071 for the United States now to 0.074
for Illinois. As predicted by our analytical results, the golden rule is optimal when the maturity
of debt is shorter than the durability of capital, but just slightly so.
The results support the case for distinguishing between very long-term investments, such as
major infrastructures and investment in equipment, for which a lower degree of debt ﬁnancing
or a shorter maturity of debt is warranted.
Table 2 measures the eﬃciency wedge in the provision of public capital for a given level of
debt ﬁnancing. This is a measure of the discrepancy between the ﬁrst-order condition of the
27It is straightforward to adjust the model to account for migration. Immigration requires assuming that some
households are born at ages greater than 0; out-migration requires adjusting the annuitization so that households
lose their private assets if they die, but not if they move out of state. Both adjustments do not aﬀect the
computations developed above to establish eﬃciency of the provision of public goods.
28Even when α<¯ δΓ, in all of the calibrated examples debt decreases the cost perceived by all generations
alive, which implies that x∗ is unique.
25U.S. Now U.S. 1880s Illinois Now
Under Balanced Bugdet
¯ δΓ =0 .03 20% 46% 43%
¯ δΓ =0 .06 14% 32% 30%
Under Golden Rule
¯ δΓ =0 .03 3% 3% 3%
¯ δΓ =0 .06 -4% -8% -7%
Table 2: Eﬃciency Wedge =
Meq−Mopt
Mopt




where Meq = marginal value of public capital in the political-economic equilibrium outcome and
Mopt = marginal value of public capital in an eﬃcient allocation. As an example, a reading of
50% means that only those public infrastructures would be ﬁnanced that generate a present
value of beneﬁts of more than $1.50 per $1 invested. We choose this as our main welfare measure
because, as we discuss more in the appendix, it is likely to be robust to changes in preferences,
and possibly to the inclusion of public capital in the production function.29
First, we consider the consequences of adopting a balanced budget provision that forbids
the government ever to borrow. These results coincide to those of any rule in which the deﬁcit
limit is independent of current spending; a prominent example of such a rule is the European
stability pact, which used to cap deﬁcits at 3% of GDP independently of public spending.30 The
29An alternative measure of the costs and beneﬁts of switching policy is cast in (private) consumption equiv-
alents. Using the calibration presented in appendix B.2, the cost estimates turn out to be quite small. As an
example, for δ =0 .06, the welfare gain, aggregated across generations, from moving from a balanced budget
to the eﬃcient policy is a permanent increase of about 0.01% of consumption for the U.S. government, and of
about 0.09% of consumption for Illinois. These small magnitudes are not surprising, since public investment
is only about 1% of GDP for the federal government and 2% for Illinois, and our model does not include any
complementarities between private and public goods on either the consumption or the production side.
30For a discussion of ﬁscal policy rules in relation to the EMU, see Buiter [11].
26table shows that the eﬃciency losses from this type of policy can be substantial. Unlike the
optimal amount of debt, the eﬃciency wedge is quite diﬀerent across calibrations. It is smallest
for current U.S. demographics, which are much closer to Ricardian equivalence,31 and larger for
1880s demographics or the case of Illinois. These results provide a rationale for adopting the
1800s rule in the 18th and 19th century rather than now, and for adopting the rule at the state
or local level rather than at the national level.
By contrast, in the case of 100% debt ﬁnancing, as prescribed by the golden rule, the eﬃciency
losses from deviating from x∗ are quite small; the worst loss comes from the 1880s calibration
with δ =0 .06, where projects are undertaken if they generate a present value of beneﬁts of $0.92
per $1 invested.
In driving diﬀerences across calibrations, three factors are most important:
• The degree of mortality/mobility. As expected, higher mortality or mobility implies greater
departures from Ricardian equivalence, since it makes it more likely that a household alive
today will not enjoy the long-term beneﬁts of public capital. High mobility is the main
factor driving Illinois (and all other states) away from Ricardian equivalence.
• Population growth. Higher population growth implies that the beneﬁt of current public
investment will beneﬁt larger cohorts in the future; this creates bigger departures from
Ricardian equivalence. The high population growth in 1880 justiﬁes the large wedges
for that calibration. By contrast, because of its slow growth, Illinois is in fact closer to
Ricardian equivalence than the median state.
• The age structure of population. The cohorts most likely to neglect future beneﬁts of
current investment are the old (because of mortality) and, in the case of states, the young
(because of mobility). Hence, states with large young and/or old population are more likely
to invest suboptimally if no provision for diﬀerential treatment of capital and ordinary
expenses is present.
31A calibration to European data, with even lower population growth, would lead to even lower eﬃciency losses.
275 Extensions
Our analysis has relied on several assumptions. We discuss here the roles of the main ones and
speculate on the consequences of changing them.
1. Altruism. We assumed that households alive do not care about future cohorts. To the
extent that diﬀerent generations are altruistically linked, as in Barro [5], the case of the
federal government would be even closer to Ricardian equivalence than what we found in
our calibration. A small departure from Ricardian equivalence would persist because of
the nontrivial immigration into the United States. Intergenerational altruism would have
a much smaller impact on state-level results, since it would not aﬀect the consequences of
mobility.
2. Capitalization of Taxes and Amenities into Land Prices. In our analysis, migration
decisions are exogenous, and public goods have no impact on land prices. If land prices
are ﬁxed, endogenous mobility would strengthen the beneﬁts of the golden rule: without
borrowing, current generations would have even less incentive to invest in public capital,
since additional investment would trigger more immigration, reducing the beneﬁt through
congestion.32 However, this eﬀect is likely to be swamped by the migration ﬂows that occur
for reasons that are independent of taxes and beneﬁts.33 If additional public investment
raises land prices, households that move out of a jurisdiction (whether for exogenous or
endogenous reasons) would be able to recoup their contribution when they sell their land
to new immigrants. Hence, full land capitalization of public improvements could act as
a substitute for the golden rule, ensuring eﬃciency even under a balanced budget. The
degree of capitalization will be aﬀected by two key parameters:
• The price elasticity of the demand for land. At the extreme, if demand is inﬁnitely
elastic, the only diﬀerence between areas with more or fewer amenities would be the
32See e.g. Schultz and Sj¨ ostr¨ om [34].
33As an example, even for the very targeted AFDC transfer programs, Meyer [20] and Gelbach [16] ﬁnd that
endogenous mobility, while present, has a quantitatively small impact on the programs.
28size of the houses (the better the amenities, the smaller the houses/lots). If instead
the size of the houses and lots is ﬁxed (e.g., by zoning laws), the price impact will be
greatest.34
• The elasticity of immigration with respect to public goods. If location decisions are
primarily driven by idiosyncratic shocks, then additional public goods will generate
little net immigration, and correspondingly small price eﬀects. By contrast, if location
decisions are primarily driven by the amenities oﬀered by the community, capitaliza-
tion of public goods into land prices will be more prominent.
Both factors tend to generate an important role for land capitalization at the local jurisdic-
tion level, a topic addressed by a vast literature that follows Tiebout [39]. As remarked by
Tiebout, however, the same factors will lead to less land capitalization at the state level.35
3. Alternative Preferences. The results obtained above rely assuming quasilinear pref-
erences and that households beneﬁt equally from public goods at all ages. In appendix
C, we compare the results for quasilinear preferences and for a more-standard log choice.
Unfortunately, when preferences are not quasilinear, a Markov equilibrium will typically
depend on the entire distribution of wealth across the living cohorts; computing equilib-
ria with both endogenous policy and long-lived overlapping generations is infeasible. We
therefore study economies in which overlapping generations live for (at most) two periods.
The results turn out to be quite similar, which makes us optimistic also for the case of
long-lived overlapping generations. Heterogeneity in the valuation of public goods is quite
straightforward to introduce; very little can be said in general, except for the obvious point
that more debt ﬁnancing would be called for if the pivotal voters tend to like the public
34The importance of this channel is acknowledged by Fullerton and Gordon [15], Stiglitz [36] and Mieszkowski
and Zodrow [21], among others.
35See footnote 9 in Tiebout [39]. However, if the public goods provided by the state are essentially local in
nature, land capitalization would still occur, albeit not uniformly across the state. In this case, property taxes
could be used as a form of “beneﬁt taxation.” Wallis [40] and Wallis and Weingast [41] argue that this was an
important factor for U.S. states in the 1800s. For a case in which debt capitalization into land prices may occur
and lead to improved eﬃciency at the national level, see Rangel [29].
29good less than the average person in the economy, and vice versa.
4. Intergenerational Transfers. In computing eﬃcient allocations, we assumed that the
planner can transfer resources across diﬀerent cohorts. However, the constitutional ar-
rangement that we speciﬁed does not allow such transfers. This implies that constitutional
changes in the level of debt ﬁnancing would have redistributive consequences; speciﬁcally,
a higher degree of debt ﬁnancing would favor current generations at the expense of future
ones that would be burdened by the extra debt. We thus have not completed a thorough
study of the conditions that favor the introduction of the golden rule in the constitution. In
the case of U.S. states, we speculate that the inability to borrow in the wake of the defaults
of the 1840s made it less costly for the generations alive to agree to deﬁcit restrictions; in
fact, those restrictions may have eased access to credit markets, at least to ﬁnance public
projects.36
5. Distortionary Taxes. In our analysis, we assumed all taxes to be lump sum. In the
presence of distortionary taxes, a wide literature on optimal debt ﬁnancing has emerged
since Barro [6] and Lucas and Stokey [19]. Their main prescription is that distortionary
taxes should be varied smoothly over time and/or across states; hence, periods of un-
usually high government spending (such as wars) should be ﬁnanced by either deﬁcits or
state-contingent capital levies. Tax smoothing explains why many state constitutions have
provisions allowing deﬁcits under special circumstances, such as periods of civil unrest. We
view our theory as complementary to theories of tax smoothing. Our theory would explain
why durable and nondurable government purchases that turn out to be similar in terms
of intertemporal volatility should be ﬁnanced very diﬀerently, one by borrowing, the other
out of current revenues.
6. Distortions from the Political Process. In our model, citizens directly choose both
durable and nondurable purchases for that period by voting each period. Bigger departures
36Rangel [28] and Boldrin and Montes [10] consider explicitly intergenerational transfers as a tool to gain wider
support for the provision of public goods. In a speciﬁc example, they view social security as a way to pay the
elderly oﬀ in exchange for the provision of public education.
30from Ricardian equivalence are generated by political-economy models with politicians
who act as if they are more short-sighted than voters.37 Some of these models may be
easily extended to strengthen the case for adopting a rule,38 while others do not clearly
generate a distinction between government spending in durable and nondurable goods.39
A more systematic analysis of the performance of the golden rule in such environments is
a worthwhile extension of our research.
6 Concluding Remarks
The tax smoothing models of Barro [6], Aiyagari et.al. [2], and Lucas and Stokey [19] explain
how issuing risk-free or state-contingent government debt allows a benevolent government to
ﬁnance an exogenous process for government expenditures by levying ﬂat rate taxes across time
and states in the least distorting ways. By assuming that all taxes are lump sum and that
government purchases of durable and nondurable public expenditures are chosen each period
by majorities, we focus on a diﬀerent reason for government debt: to realign the interests of
majorities of voters in ways that will induce them to choose more eﬃcient allocations of public
and private goods. By studying the eﬀects of our two-parameter class of constitutions that
allow majorities to issue debt to ﬁnance only durable public goods, we thus oﬀer a reason for
government debt that is complementary to the one studied by Barro and Lucas and Stokey. Our
model provides a framework for evaluating proposals, for example, to substitute a golden rule
for the maximum percentage of GDP deﬁcit rule stated in the Maastricht Treaty.
37Chari and Miller [13] rely on these models in their informal discussion to advocate the adoption of the golden
rule at the federal level.
38We view extensions of Rogoﬀ and Sibert [31] and Rogoﬀ [30] as particularly good candidates because they
imply a tendency to choose projects with immediate beneﬁts over projects with delayed beneﬁts.
39Among these, the most natural extension of models of partisan politics such as Alesina and Tabellini [3],
Persson and Svensson [23], or Tabellini and Alesina [38] would generate overspending in both types of goods,
unless government capital is perceived as a less partisan good than nondurable consumption, as assumed by
Peletier, Dur and Swank [22] and by Azzimonti-Renzo [4].
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (completion)
Our proof works by construction. We proved earlier that all competitive equilibria share the
same values of pt, Kt, wt,a n drt, t ≥ 0, and that these are all constant and independent of
{Gt,Γt}∞
t=0. This implies that, for any history ht, there is a unique way to set p(ht), K(ht),
w(ht), and r(ht). We set investment to the only values that are consistent with (5) and (6):
i(ht)=K(ht) − (1 − δk)K(ht−1)a n dγ(ht)=Γ t − (1 − δΓ)Γt−1.




















t) − Gt − γ(h
t). (29)
Subject to (29), individual consumption is not uniquely pinned down.
To construct individual consumption, we partition the set of histories into sequences {hv}∞
v=t,
t ≥− 1, with the property that, within elements of the same partition, hv =( hv−1,G(hv−1),Γ(hv−1)),
while for each initial element of a sequence either t = −1o rht  =( ht−1,G(ht−1),Γ(ht−1)). Within
each partition, a history represents a path that is induced by the functions G(.)a n dΓ ( .)f r o m
the history ht. Along each of these paths, we set the functions cs(.),k s(.), and bs(.) arbitrarily,
subject to the following restrictions:
(i) Given the taxes and prices speciﬁed above, the resulting sequences must satisfy the house-
hold budget constraints (13) for an economy that starts in period t with initial conditions
speciﬁed by (ks(ht−1),b s(ht−1))
N−1
s=0 ;
(ii) if N = ∞, the implied asset allocation must be essentially bounded from below;
32(iii) the implied real allocation must be bounded;
(iv) individual consumption schedules are such that (29) holds in the aggregate.
Examples of functions that satisfy these requirements are the following:40 ks(hv)=K(hv)/(1 −
























































By iterating equation (28) forward and using the facts that p(hv)a n dΓ ( hv) are constant
over time, we can show that B(hv) is bounded, which implies that the consumption plans of the
households are bounded.41
It is now straightforward to see that the mapping that we have just constructed generates
a competitive equilibrium starting from any history hj, given the levels of public spending and
capital implied by (24). Starting from any initial capital level, we previously showed that the
values assigned to p(ht), K(ht), w(ht)a n dr(ht), t ≥ j, are the unique choices that ensure that
the household problem has a (bounded) solution, that factor prices equal marginal products, and
that (17) holds. With these choices, households are indiﬀerent among all possible consumption
proﬁles. Given the previously determined variables and (21), equation (28) describes the unique
40If N = ∞, λN should be set to 0, and (33) and (34) do not apply.
41If N =+ ∞, the proposed asset allocation also satisﬁes the no-Ponzi games restriction and the transversality
condition (19).
33sequence of government debt that satisﬁes the government budget constraint and (19), and (29)
describes the unique sequence of aggregate consumption that is consistent with the resource
constraint (4). The conditions on the consumption of individual households ensure that the
individual budget constraints are met. Whenever the future levels of G and Γ depend only
on the future shocks and not on any history, the mapping constructed above implies that the
current choices of G and Γ do not aﬀect private capital or factor prices in any period, nor do
they aﬀect subsequent values of public spending and capital. These are precisely the conditions
under which households will vote for G and Γ according to (24), which implies that the mapping
satisﬁes condition (ii) of a political-economic equilibrium. Finally, condition (iii) is met because
it was imposed in the construction of the mapping.
To check that all Markov equilibria lead to the same ex ante welfare for all generations, notice
that prices, taxes, and the provision of the public goods are the same in all Markov equilibria and
in all histories. As a consequence, the individual household’s optimization problem is identical
in all of the equilibria, and the multiplicity of the Markov equilibria comes only from the fact
that households are indiﬀerent among many equivalent optimal consumption plans. QED.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Generically in the death process, there exists a value x∗ such that, if x = x∗,t h e
allocation induced by any Markov equilibrium is Pareto optimal. A suﬃcient condition for x∗ to
be unique is that Qs is decreasing in x for all ages.
We already observed that in a competitive equilibrium private capital and investment are
equal to their (unique) value implied by any Pareto-optimal allocation. We also proved that the
balanced-budget restriction on Gt ensures that (9) is satisﬁed. We need only to prove that there
exists a value x∗ such that the solution to (24) satisﬁes (10). First, note that Qs is linear in x.











































Γ − α)(1 − α)
j−2
For a generic death process, we have median(Q1
s)  = 0. In this case, the left-hand side of equation
(35) is a continuous function of x, and it diverges to inﬁnity as x diverges, but with opposite
signs as x →− ∞or x → +∞. This implies that a solution to equation (35) exists. If Q1
s < 0
for all ages, the median cost strictly decreases with x and the solution is unique. QED.
B Details of Calibration
B.1 Demographic Structure
1. U.S. now.
We use the death rate by age in 2000, from the National Center for Health statistics. For
the age structure we use data from the 2000 U.S. Census. We abstract from out-migration
from the U.S., which is small.42 However, the age structure reﬂects the eﬀects of nontrivial
immigration. We truncate the distribution at age 90, assuming that a 90-year old person
dies for sure; we also do not consider people below 18 years of age, so a person is “born”
when (s)he reaches age 18 or (s)he immigrates. Finally, population growth is taken from
the 10-year growth from the 1990 to the 2000 Census, at an annualized rate.
2. U.S. 1880s.
Mortality data come from Haines [17] (we use data from his “West Model”). The data are
aggregated in 5-year intervals of age, so we used piecewise linear interpolation. For deaths
42We tried including it, with little change.
35and the age structure (relevant for voters), we only consider males between 21 and 80. For
the population growth (which we assume to be relevant for taxpayers), we use the growth
of the total U.S. population from 1880 to 1890, annualized. Results change very little if
diﬀerent choices are made regarding the inclusion/exclusion of one sex from the calibration.
3. Illinois now.
For the probability of death, we use the same as the U.S. 2000 example. The probability of
death is swamped by the eﬀect of out-migration, so any diﬀerence between Illinois and the
rest of the U.S. would be quantitatively insigniﬁcant for the results. For out-migration, the
U.S. Census reports the number of people that left Illinois between 1995 and 2000, by age.
We use this to construct an annual probability of out-migration by dividing the number of
migrants by 5. We are implicitly assuming that out-migration is permanent, i.e., a person
that leaves Illinois will never return to be an Illinois resident. This is clearly an unrealistic
assumption, but we expect the bias introduced by it to be quantitatively small.
B.2 Parameter Choices for Welfare Computations
We assume that v(G,Γ) = ξ G1−σ
1−σ + η Γ1−σ
1−σ .
To pin down σ, we need a measure of the price elasticity of the demand for public goods.
DelRossi and Inman [14] survey related studies, quoting estimates between 0.17 and 5. We choose
a unit elasticity and set σ = 1 (log preferences).
To calibrate ξ and η for the federal government, we match the fraction of government con-
sumption expenditures to GDP and government gross investment to GDP from NIPA data,
which are approximately 6% and 1% respectively. For Illinois, we match the ratio of the operat-
ing budget appropriations to GDP and of capital budget appropriations to GDP (source: BEA
for GDP, State of Illinois for spending); these numbers are approximately 7% and 2%. We do
not consider the U.S. in 1880, as the scope of the federal government was extremely limited back
then.43
43For the 19th century, we chose to analyze the United States because very good mortality data by age were
readily available to us. However, that experiment is mainly designed to inform us about the likely gains for other
36We assume that the economy is in steady state, and normalize GDP to 1.44 To infer the
stock of public capital from the ﬂow of gross investment, we take the depreciation rate to be
6% (our higher choice, which does not correspond to infrastructure only). We assume that
Illinois is following the golden rule, and ﬁx ξ and η to match the appropriate ratios under this
assumption. Since the federal government is not mandated to follow any constitutional rule in
linking taxes and spending, it is less obvious what to assume. Fortunately, the results for the
federal government are less sensitive to the speciﬁc value chosen: as the wedges in table 2 imply,
even drastic changes in the degree of debt ﬁnancing have only a moderate impact on government
spending. We thus assume that the federal government follows a practice that requires, at the
margin, an extra dollar in current revenues for each extra dollar in spending of either type; this
rule is equivalent to a balanced budget, or to the 3% deﬁcit/GDP limit of the European stability
pact, or to any deﬁcit ceiling which is not conditional on spending.
The implied values for ξ are approximately .078 for the federal government and .093 for
Illinois; the implied values for η are approximately .02 at the federal level and .036 for Illinois.
C Robustness Checks
In the computations below, we compare the outcomes of quasilinear preferences with the political
outcome when households have preferences given by




logc1,s+1 +l o g ( 1− l1,s+1)+ξ log(Gs+1)+η log(Γs+1),

where lj,s is the labor supply of a person of age j in period s. To simplify the analysis, we take
factor prices as given. We will mainly comment results at the steady state, but similar numbers
occur along transition paths.
The choice of overlapping generations of two period lived people is useful computationally,
but it is also interesting because it stacks the odds against us. To see this, consider the ﬁrst-order
countries in which national governments played a more prominent role.
44Note that, in a growing economy, ξ and η should grow at the GDP rate to have balanced growth.
37condition that determines public investment in the quasilinear case:
vΓ(G,Γ) = median(Qs), (36)
where Qs in (22) is computed assuming that any additional investment undertaken today is re-
versed in the subsequent period. If the current median voter stayed in power for the subsequent
period as well, the same ﬁrst-order condition would hold, even without quasilinearity: the enve-
lope condition would imply that, at the margin, the household would be indiﬀerent whether the
current additional investment is fully undone next period, or whether some of it is passed on. The
presence of conﬂict generates two departures from this ﬁrst-order condition: ﬁrst, the envelope
condition no longer holds, since the identity of the median voter changes from one period to the
next; second, the median has to be taken over the Qs computed according to the equilibrium
process for taxes, so the identity of the median voter might change depending on the speed with
which any additional investment is reversed in the subsequent periods. However, both of these
factors play a limited role in the quantitative results of the previous section. Both mobility and
mortality change slowly with age; as a consequence, the choice of next period’s median voter is
very close to the optimal choice of the current median voter, and even a change in the identity
of the median voter is unlikely to cause drastic changes in policy. By contrast, with overlapping
generations living for two periods, the conﬂict between the current median voter (which we will
take to be the young, assuming population growth) and the future median voter is extreme, since
their survival proﬁles are radically diﬀerent.
We construct a sequence of numerical examples. Even though we occasionally chose some pa-
rameter values to match data, these are meant purely to illustrate the extent to which quasilinear
preferences and log preferences yield similar results.
In example 1, we set one period to be 30 years; this gives households a reasonable life span,
but it implies an unreasonably long lag between one policy session and the next. We thus choose
the following parameter values:
• θ0 = 1: the young survive for sure 1 more period, leading to maximal conﬂict between the
two generations alive;
38• n = 1: population doubles from one period to the next;
• r =5a n dδk = .84: this corresponds to a yearly depreciation of about 6% and a net rate
of return of capital of 5.62% per year;
• β = 1
1+r−δk: this implies that the individual consumption proﬁle is ﬂat;
• α =0 .2: this implies a half-life of debt of about 3 periods (93 years);
• δΓ =0 .6, about 1.7% per year;
• w = 10;
• η =0 .02, ξ =0 .133; this implies that, in the steady state of the golden rule, public
investment/GDP is 2% and public consumption/GDP is 7%.
• Throughout the example, the government is not allowed to issue debt to pay for public
consumption; in steady state, this turns out to be eﬃcient, since both generations alive
have the same private consumption level and hence the same valuation of the public good.
Optimal debt Steady-state wedge Steady-state wedge
if starting at golden rule under balanced budget under Golden Rule
Log 6% 3.8% -54%
Linear 7% 4.2% -54.2%
Table 3: Public investment and eﬃciency in example 1
Table 3 illustrates the results for this case. The ﬁrst column illustrates the following experi-
ment. We assume that the economy starts from the steady state implied by the political-economic
equilibrium that prevails under the golden rule. At time 0, the fraction x of investment ﬁnanced
through bonds is unexpectedly changed once and for all. We compute the compensating vari-
ation that makes each generation indiﬀerent between the original value of x and the new one.
Typically, early generations will be hurt by a sudden reduction in x, since they will be able to
39pass on less debt to future generations, while later generations beneﬁt from the lower steady-state
level of debt. We aggregate welfare using the interest rate as the discount factor, which would
be appropriate if the government could use generation-speciﬁc lump-sum transfers for compen-
sation. The optimal amount of debt ﬁnancing turns out to be quite low in this case: this is not
surprising, since most public capital depreciates from one period to the next. More interestingly,
log and linear preferences yield almost identical answers.
In the second column, we look at the wedge in the marginal utility of public capital between
the eﬃcient provision level and the one prevailing in steady state when the government is not
allowed to issue any debt (x = 0). In the third, we study the same wedge, but in the steady state
when the government follows the golden rule (x = 1). Even for these measures of distortion,
linear and log preferences yield essentially identical results.
The results of example 1 are driven to a signiﬁcant extent by the high discount factor and the
low durability of public capital. In example 2, we choose numbers closer to a yearly calibration;
this implies of course that people in this artiﬁcial economy would live only for 2 years.
Parameter values are now: θ0 =1 ,n =0 .02, β =0 .96, δk = δΓ =0 .06, r = .102 (such that
β = 1
1+r−δk), α =0 .045, and η, ξ and w at the same values of the ﬁrst example.
Optimal debt Steady-state wedge Steady-state wedge
if starting at golden rule under balanced budget under Golden Rule
Log 66% 59% -16%
Linear 53% 18% -16%
Table 4: Public investment and eﬃciency in example 2
For this example, the diﬀerence between log and linear preferences is more signiﬁcant. How-
ever, this diﬀerence almost vanishes if we reduce the probability of survival from young to old
age to θ0 =0 .4, as shown in table 5. Since θ0 =0 .4 still implies a high degree of conﬂict across
generations, we view this result as very encouraging for the accuracy of the predictions contained
in section 4.
Finally, to assess the impact of wealth eﬀects, we change the interest rate r to 22.7% for the
40Optimal debt Steady-state wedge Steady-state wedge
if starting at golden rule under balanced budget under Golden Rule
Log 89% 564% -66%
Linear 89% 562% -66%
Table 5: Public investment and eﬃciency in example 2, with θ0 =0 .4
log economy only, so that, in the steady state, consumption of the old is 12% higher than that
of the young.45 The approximation remains acceptable, except for distortion levels that are very
Optimal debt Steady-state wedge Steady-state wedge
if starting at golden rule under balanced budget under Golden Rule
Log 81% 263% -62%
Linear 89% 562% -66%
Table 6: Public investment and eﬃciency in example 2, with θ0 =0 .4 and an increasing con-
sumption proﬁle
far from anything that we considered in section 4.
The presence of a wealth eﬀect implies that a balanced-budget restriction will no longer lead
to eﬃciency in public consumption; since the young are relatively poorer, they will choose a
lower level of G than optimality would dictate. Table 7 explores a potential role for letting the
government issue debt as a way of restoring eﬃciency. While allowing a tiny fraction of debt
ﬁnancing improves welfare, the results suggest again that the diﬀerence between linear and log
preferences is small; the main implication that spending in nondurable public goods should not
be ﬁnanced through debt is upheld.
45For the linear economy, the consumption proﬁle is indeterminate, and an increase in r with no change in β
would lead to unbounded solutions.
41Optimal debt Steady-state wedge
if starting at golden rule under Golden Rule
Log 6% 3%
Linear 0% 0%
Table 7: Public consumption and eﬃciency in example 2, with θ0 =0 .4 and an increasing
consumption proﬁle
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